making of this amendment. No comments were received on the proposed rule or the FAA's determination of the cost to the public.

After careful review of all available information related to the subject presented above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed except for minor editorial corrections. The FAA has determined that these minor corrections will not change the meaning of the AD and will not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed.

The FAA estimates that 21 sailplanes in the U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 1 workhour per sailplane to accomplish the required action, and that the average labor rate is approximately $60 an hour. Parts cost approximately $25 per sailplane. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $1,785. This figure is based on the assumption that no affected sailplane owner/operator has accomplished the required modification. The FAA believes that several of the 21 affected sailplane owners/operators have already accomplished the required modification, thereby reducing the cost impact upon the public.

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ''significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the final evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES.**

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new AD to read as follows:

95–09–11 Schempp-Hirth: Amendment 39–9215; Docket No. 94–CE–17–AD.

Applicability: Cirrus and Cirrus VTC Sailplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each sailplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For sailplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) of this AD to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any sailplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required upon the accumulation of 500 hours time-in-service (TIS) or within the next 20 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished.

To prevent airbrake system failure caused by broken coupling balls on the airbrake actuating lever, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in sailplane controllability problems, accomplish the following:

(a) Modify the airbrake actuating lever and replace the airbrake system coupling balls (located on the actuating lever) in accordance with the instructions in Schempp-Hirth Technical Note No. 265–10, dated November 5, 1992.

(b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the sailplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, 1201 Walnut, suite 900, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Small Airplane Directorate.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Small Airplane Directorate.

(d) The modification required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Schempp-Hirth Technical Note No. 265–10, dated November 5, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Schempp-Hirth Flugzeubau GmbH, Krebenstr. 25, D–7312 Kirchheim/Teck, Germany. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(e) This amendment (39–9215) becomes effective on June 9, 1995.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on April 26, 1995.

Henry A. Armstrong,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95–10830 Filed 5–5–95; 8:45 am]

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14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 91–CE–40–AD; Amendment 39–9216; AD 95–09–12]

Airworthiness Directives; Alexander Schleicher Models ASW–12, ASW–15, ASW–15B, and ASW–17 Gliders

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 88–11–05, which currently requires repetitively inspecting the wing spar of Alexander Schleicher Models ASW–15 and ASW–15B gliders for wood rot, and replacing any wing spar where wood rot is found. Alexander Schleicher Models ASW–12 and ASW–17 gliders are of a similar type design to Models ASW–15 and ASW–15B gliders, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in working with the Civil Aviation Authority of Germany, has decided that the actions referenced in AD 88–11–05 should also apply to Models ASW–12 and ASW–17 gliders. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the wing spar caused

by wood rot, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane.

DATES: Effective June 9, 1995.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of June 9, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Service information that applies to this AD may be obtained from Alexander Schleicher GmbH & Company, D–36163, Popppenhausen-Wasserkuppe, Germany; or Eastern Sailplane, Heath Stage Route Shelburne Falls, Massachusetts 01370; telephone (413) 625–6059. This information may also be examined at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Herman Belderok, Project Officer, Gliders, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, 1201 Walnut, suite 900, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 426–6932; facsimile (816) 426–2169.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to certain Alexander Schleicher Models ASW–12, ASW–15, ASW–15B, and ASW–17 gliders was published in the **Federal Register** on December 19, 1994 (59 FR 65282). The action proposed to supersede AD 88–11–05, Amendment 39–5997, with a new AD that would (1) retain the requirement of repetitively inspecting the wing spar for wood rot on the Models ASW–15 and ASW–15B gliders, and replacing the wing spar if wood rot is found; and (2) extend these repetitive inspections and possible replacement to Models ASW–12 and ASW–17 gliders. Accomplishment of the proposed inspections would be in accordance with either Alexander Schleicher ASW–15 Technical Note (TN) No. 23, dated April 21, 1988; Alexander Schleicher ASW–12 TN No. 4, dated May 10, 1989; or Alexander Schleicher ASW–17 TN No. 12, dated May 8, 1989, as applicable.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. No comments were received on the proposed rule or the FAA's determination of the cost to the public.

After careful review of all available information related to the subject presented above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule as proposed except for minor editorial corrections. The FAA has determined that these minor corrections will not change the meaning of the AD or add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed.

The compliance time presented in this AD is based upon calendar time instead of hours time-in-service. Rotting of the wood wing box spar is caused by moisture and the condition could exist or develop regardless of whether the glider is in actual operation. For this reason, the FAA has determined that the compliance time of the required AD action should be in calendar time.

The FAA estimates that 50 gliders (7 ASW–12's, 27 ASW–15's, 6 ASW–15B's, and 10 ASW–17's) in the U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will take approximately 6 workhours per glider to accomplish the required action, and that the average labor rate is approximately $60 an hour. Parts cost approximately $110 per glider, and the required core analysis costs $185. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $32,750. This figure is based upon the assumption that no affected glider owner/operator has accomplished the proposed inspection, nor does it account for repetitive inspections. The FAA has no way of determining the number of repetitive inspections an owner/operator may incur.

In addition, AD 88–11–05 currently mandates the same actions that are required by this final rule AD on 33 gliders. With this in mind, the cost impact of the AD upon U.S. operators is reduced $21,615 from $32,750 to $11,135.

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ''significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the final evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES**.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. App. 1354(a), 1421 and 1423; 49 U.S.C. 106(g); and 14 CFR 11.89.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing AD 88–11–05, Amendment 39–5997, and by adding a new AD to read as follows:

95–09–12 Alexander Schleicher: Amendment 39–9216; Docket No. 91–CE–40–AD.

Applicability: Models ASW–12, ASW–15, ASW–15B, and ASW–17 gliders (all serial numbers), certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each glider identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For gliders that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (g) of this AD to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any glider from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required initially as follows, and thereafter as indicated in the body of this AD:

1. For Models ASW–12 and ASW–17: Within the next 6 calendar months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished.

2. For Models ASW–15 and ASW–15B: On or before the last day of the 12th calendar month after the last inspection required by AD 88–11–05, Amendment 39–5997.

To prevent failure of the wing spar caused by wood rot, which, if not detected and

corrected, could result in loss of control of the glider, accomplish the following:

(a) Visually inspect the wing spar for wood rot in accordance with either Action Paragraphs 1.1 through 1.3 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–12 Technical Note (TN) No. 4, dated May 10, 1989; Action Paragraphs 1.1, 1.2, and 2.1 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–15 TN No. 23, dated April 21, 1988; or Action Paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–17 TN No. 12, dated May 8, 1989, as applicable.

(b) Mark and send wood cores obtained through the inspection specified in paragraph (a) of this AD to a mycology laboratory for microscopical inspection to detect heavy wood destroying fungal infestation in accordance with either Action Paragraph 1.3 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–12 TN No. 4, dated May 10, 1989; Action Paragraph 2.1 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–15 TN No. 23, dated April 21, 1988; or Action Paragraph 1.2 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–17 TN No. 12, dated May 8, 1989, as applicable.

(c) If moisture damage, swelling, evidence that water has penetrated into the spar fork, or fungal infestation is found, prior to further flight after the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, accomplish the following:

(1) Wait for the results of the microscopical examination and then obtain a repair scheme from the manufacturer through the Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, at the address specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, and incorporate this repair scheme.

(2) Apply preservative, strengthen the inspection hole area, and close the hole in accordance with either Action Paragraph 1.4 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–12 TN No. 4, dated May 10, 1989; Action Paragraph 2.2 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–15 TN No. 23, dated April 21, 1988; or Action Paragraph 1.3 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–17 TN No. 12, dated May 8, 1989, as applicable.

(d) If no moisture damage, swelling, evidence that water has penetrated into the spar fork, or fungal infestation is found, accomplish the following:

(1) Prior to further flight after the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, apply preservative, strengthen the inspection hole area, and close the hole in accordance with either Action Paragraph 1.4 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–12 TN No. 4, dated May 10, 1989; Action Paragraph 2.2 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–15 TN No. 23, dated April 21, 1988; or Action Paragraph 1.3 of Alexander Schleicher ASW–17 TN No. 12, dated May 8, 1989, as applicable.

(2) Operation of the glider during the microscopical examination of the wood core is permitted. However, if these examination results reveal heavy wood destroying fungal infestation, prior to further flight after receiving the results, obtain a repair scheme from the manufacturer through the Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, at the address specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, and incorporate this repair scheme.

(e) The inspection requirements specified in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this AD, excluding the wood core microscopical examination requirements, shall be accomplished annually on or before the last day of the 12th calendar month after the last inspection.

(f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with §§ 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the glider to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(g) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the initial or repetitive compliance times that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, 1201 Walnut, suite 900, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Small Airplane Directorate.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Small Airplane Directorate.

(h) The inspections required by this AD shall be done in accordance with either Alexander Schleicher ASW–12 Technical Note No. 4, dated May 10, 1989; Alexander Schleicher ASW–15 Technical Note No. 23, dated April 21, 1988; or Alexander Schleicher ASW–17 Technical Note No. 12, dated May 8, 1989, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Alexander Schleicher GmbH & Company, D–36163, Popppenhausen-Wasserkuppe, Germany; or Eastern Sailplane, Heath Stage Route Shelburne Falls, Massachusetts 01370. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(i) This amendment (39–9216) supersedes AD 88–11–05, Amendment 39–5997.

(j) This amendment (39–9216) becomes effective on June 9, 1995.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on April 26, 1995.

Henry Armstrong,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 95–10831 Filed 5–5–95; 8:45 am]

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14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–NM–73–AD; Amendment 39–9218; AD 95–10–01]

Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125–1000A Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125–1000A series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect various discrepancies of the fuel hose assemblies on the auxiliary power unit (APU), and correction of any discrepancy found. This amendment is prompted by several reports of heat damage to the fuel hose assembly on the APU. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of a fuel hose due to heat damage caused by incorrect routing or bleed air leakage; such failure could result in a malfunction of the APU, a fuel fire in the fuselage rear equipment bay, and reduced structural integrity of the surrounding structure.

DATES: Effective May 23, 1995.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 23, 1995.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 7, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–NM–73–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Raytheon Corporate Jets, Inc., Customer Support Department, Adams Field, P.O. Box 3356, Little Rock, Arkansas 72203. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Schroeder, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM–113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056; telephone (206) 227–2148; fax (206) 227–1320.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which is the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on certain Raytheon Model Hawker 1000 and BAe 125–1000A series airplanes. The CAA advises that it has received recent reports of heat damage to the fuel feed hose assemblies on the auxiliary power unit (APU) installed on several Model BAe 125–1000A airplanes. In one case, the outer sheath was charred due to a suspected leak of the bleed air. In another case, while performing a pre-flight inspection, the flight crew found